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We study the dynamic general equilibrium of an economy where
risk averse shareholders delegate the management of the ¯rm to risk
averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an
incentive component corresponding to a non-tradable equity position
and a variable 'salary' component indexed to the aggregate wage bill
and to aggregate dividends. Tying a manager's compensation to the
performance of her own ¯rm ensures that her interests are aligned with
the goals of ¯rm owners and that maximizing the discounted sum of
future dividends will be her objective. Linking managers' compensa-
tion to overall economic performance is also required to make sure that
managers use the appropriate stochastic discount factor to value those
future dividends.
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11 Introduction
Executive compensation is making headlines across the world. While the
dramatic increase in the level of executive remuneration has been at the
center of the controversy, other features have been noted as well. Large
compensation payouts in times of poor performance, in particular, have
fueled suspicions of managerial entrenchment, `back-scratching', etc.
This paper makes a very simple but fundamental point. Internal incen-
tive considerations imply that a manager's compensation must be tied to the
performance of her own ¯rm. Performance-based compensation ensures that
her interests are aligned with the goals of ¯rm owners and that maximizing
the discounted sum of future dividends will be her objective. When viewed
in the light of general equilibrium theory, however, incentive considerations
also require that a manager's compensation be linked to aggregate economic
performance. This is required to guarantee that managers use the appro-
priate stochastic discount factor to value those future dividends. Moreover,
these two aspects of performance compensation must, in a sense to be made
precise, be adapted to one another if self-interested managers with private
information are to make the right intertemporal decisions on behalf of ¯rm
owners.
One striking implication of our perspective is that it may well be per-
fectly appropriate for the manager of an underperforming ¯rm to receive
an increase in her compensation package. Indeed, we will show that the re-
quirements of an optimal contract will make this situation the norm rather
than the exception.
We make our point in a simple in¯nite horizon dynamic general equi-
librium model where both shareholders and managers are risk averse. The
advantage of our set-up is that we can identify the contract that imple-
ments the ¯rst best allocation and, as a consequence, be fully speci¯c as to
the requirements of an optimal contract. Reality is likely to be more murky,
in particular because ¯rm owners' information on managers' private wealth
and actions may be incomplete. Yet the lessons that we draw in our simple
set-up remain applicable. To the best of our knowledge our model is a ¯rst
application of dynamic agency theory in a world where both principal and
agent are risk averse.
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 spells out the model. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes the ¯rst best allocation of resources. Section 4 argues
that there exists an optimal contract decentralizing the ¯rst best alloca-
tion of resources and completely characterizes this optimal contract under
the assumption that the manager's e®ort level is immaterial for production.
2The optimal contract requires not only endowing the manager with a non-
tradable equity share of the ¯rm but also ensuring that the time series prop-
erties of the manager's stochastic discount factor, and thus her consumption,
are identical to those of the ¯rm owners. This latter condition in turn re-
quires that the manager's remuneration includes a time-varying salary-like
component whose properties are indexed to the aggregate wage bill. Section
5 generalizes this characterization to the situation where manager's (unob-
servable) e®ort is essential for production while Section 6 develops the case
of an economy with multiple ¯rms. The salary component of a manager's
remuneration must then include a share in the aggregate economy-wide div-
idend payment but, rather strikingly, a manager's equity stake in the ¯rm
under management cannot exceed her share of the market portfolio. Section
7 reviews some related literature while Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
For ease of exposition we start with the assumption that the entire economy's
output is produced by a single perfectly competitive ¯rm. Section 6 discusses
the extension to many ¯rms. There is a continuum of identical agents of
measure (1 + ¹), a subset of which { of measure ¹ - are selected at the
beginning of time to permanently manage the ¯rm. The rest act as workers
and shareholders. We entertain two views on the role of managers. In the
¯rst approach, managers are key to making the strategic employment and
(especially) investment decisions of the ¯rm, but they have no impact on
static e±ciency (on how capital and labor translate into output within the
period of production). Under the second approach, managerial e®ort a®ects
the total per period output that can be produced from a given quantity
of capital and labor. In both situations, managers are self-interested and
assumed to make all the relevant decisions in view of maximizing their own
intertemporal utility. When they make the hiring and investing decisions on
behalf of ¯rm owners, managers are viewed as acting collegially and thus we
may refer to them collectively as \the manager". We follow Raith (2005) in
assuming the manager's participation constraint is not binding (see footnote
11).
At the center of our attention is the repeated principal-agent problem
between the (risk averse) shareholders of the ¯rm and the (risk averse) man-
ager and its general equilibrium dimension. The moral hazard problem we
focus on has two elements: the ¯rst is the familiar one that arises if the
executive's e®ort choice is non-veri¯able. The second results from the fact
3that the manager possesses speci¯c knowledge that she may not use in the
best interest of shareholders. One of the main motives for delegation is, in-
deed, to relieve shareholders of the day-to-day operation of the ¯rm and the
information requirements it entails. This means that shareholders delegate
to the manager the hiring and investment decisions and all that goes with
them (human resource management, project evaluation, etc.) but that, as
a by-product, they lose the informational base upon which to evaluate and
monitor the manager's performance.
The ¯rm is fully described by a constant returns to scale production
function f(kt;nt;¹et)¸t where kt is capital stock available at the beginning
of period t, nt stands for employment, et is per capital managerial e®ort,
and ¸t is the customary aggregate technology shock. The law of motion for
capital stock is kt+1 = (1 ¡ ­)kt + it where it is investment and ­ is the
rate of depreciation.
At the beginning of period t, the manager privately observes the re-
alization of the productivity parameter ¸t; she then makes her utility-
maximizing decisions (cm
t ;et;nt;it) in light of her remuneration contract,
gm(xt; ^ st). Here cm
t is the manager's period t consumption while xt is a
measure of the ¯rm's performance to be identi¯ed later. Managerial remu-
neration may also depend on other economic variables observable by the
¯rm owners (and on which they may write contracts). We choose to denote
the state of the economy as perceived by ¯rm owners by the expression ^ st
while st = (kt;¸t) represents the true state of the economy as perceived
by the fully-informed managers: ^ st, in particular, di®ers from st in that it
does not include ¸t since the latter is private information of the manager.
The manager is not given access to capital markets and she has no outside
source of income.1 She therefore consumes the income she receives from
the ¯rm. This assumption is essential to be able to identify unambiguously
the ¯rst best contract. Given that the contract we discuss is optimal, the
assumption, in e®ect, is not restrictive. Our analysis can be extended with-
out di±culty to situations where ¯rm owners have full information on the
manager's outside income and actions.
Given a level of e®ort et and in the absence of retained earnings, decisions
(nt;it) yield distributions or dividends
dt = f(kt;nt;¹et)¸t ¡ ntwt ¡ ¹gm (xt; ^ st) ¡ it ´ ^ dt ¡ ¹gm (xt; ^ st);
1In a companion paper we allow the manager to trade securities; see Danthine and
Donaldson (2007).
4where wt is the market equilibrium wage rate and ^ dt is free-cash-°ow
before payment to managers.
Let u(¢) represents the manager's utility of consumption, H(¢) her disu-
tility of e®ort, ¯ the discount factor common to all economic agents and
F(¢) the probability transition function on ¸t. The manager' s problem
then reads:







t ) ¡ H(et)] (1)
s.t.
cm
t = gm (xt; ^ st);
xt = x(it;nt;et;st);
kt+1 = (1 ¡ ­)kt + it;k0 given
cm
t ;et;it;nt ¸ 0;
¸t+1 » dF (¸t+1;¸t);¸0 given:
The representative shareholder-worker-consumer is confronted with
a work/leisure decision and a portfolio investment decision. The form of his
optimization problem is standard although we initially remain vague as to
the precise content of his information set. The representative shareholder-
worker's problem reads:

















^ st+1 » dG(^ st+1; ^ st); ^ s0 given.
In problem (2), u(¢) is the consumer-worker-investor's (homogeneous)
period utility of consumption function, ^ H(¢) is his disutility of work function,
cs
t his period t consumption, ns
t his period t labor supply, zt+1 the fraction
of the single equity share purchased by him at the end of period t, while
G(.) describes the transition probabilities for the relevant state variables.
Note that we assume both agent types have the same discount factor and
the same preferences over consumption. The potential con°ict of interests
between the two agent classes - to be described shortly - arises endogenously
5and is not a result of postulated di®erences in preferences (in contrast with
much of the literature - see Section 7).
3 Characterizing the ¯rst best allocation
In this section we characterize the ¯rst best allocation for the economy of
Section 2. Noting that the aggregate state of the economy is given by (kt;¸t),
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t + it = f(kt;nt;¹et)¸t;




st+1 » dF (¸t+1;¸t);¸0 given,
where M and 1 ¡ M are arbitrary welfare weights attributed to an in-
dividual manager and shareholder, respectively. We introduce the following
assumptions:
A.1: u(¢) is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly concave and in-
creasing on R+; the Inada conditions hold.
A.2: ^ H(¢) is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly convex and in-
creasing on R+.
A.3: f(¢;¢) is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly concave and in-
creasing on R+ £ R+; the Inada conditions hold.
A.4: H(¢) is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly increasing and
convex on R+.
A standard result follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose A.1-A.4 hold. Then there exist a di®erentiable value
function W(kt;¸t) and continuous policy functions fn(kt;¸t);e(kt;¸t);
i(kt;¸t);cm(kt;¸t);cs(kt;¸t)g which solve problem (3). Furthermore,
there exist fk;kg such that k · kt · k;8t provided k0 2 [k;k].
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+ (1 ¡ M)[u(f(kt;ns
t;¹et)¸t ¡ it ¡ ¹cm




W ((1 ¡ ­)kt + it;¸t+1)dF(¸t+1;¸t)g (4)
Under A.1-A.3, the necessary and su±cient F.O.C's for (4) are, 8t,
u1(cs
t)f2(kt;ns



























t + it = f(kt;nt;¹et)¸t ´ yt: (9)
Using (7), condition (8) can be written
u1(cm
t )f3(kt;nt;¹et)¸t = H1(et): (10)
Condition (5) is the standard marginal condition determining the worker's
optimal supply of labor. Condition (10) is the equivalent condition for the
e®ort level of the manager. Equation (6) is an equally standard condition
determining investment. Note that the relevant intertemporal rate of sub-
stitution is the manager's, but the Pareto Optimality condition (7) implies
that this could equally well be the shareholder's. Finally equation (9) is
the overall resource availability constraint. In the next section we discuss
the optimal contract under the simplifying assumption that the e®ort of the
manager plays no role in determining the period output of the ¯rm.
74 The optimal contract: the no e®ort case
We take as a benchmark the situation where the e®ort of the manager is
irrelevant. We assume f3 ´ 0 and drop the manager's e®ort from the pro-
duction function for notational simplicity.
The representative shareholder's problem (2) has the following recursive
representation
V s(^ st) = max
fzt+1;ns
tg
fu(zt (dt + qt) + wtns




V s (zt+1; ^ st+1)dG(¢)g
whose solution is characterized by:2
u1(cs






t+1)[qt+1 + dt+1]dG(¢): (13)
Note, from (12), that worker-shareholders' (static) labor supply deci-
sions are independent of the probability distribution summarizing their in-
formation. The same cannot be said of their portfolio investment decisions
(equation (13)) which forms the basis for equity pricing. We elect not to
be speci¯c as to the exact information set of shareholders as we do not
pursue the issue of asset pricing. Observe, however, that no information be-
yond what shareholders possess can be included in the stock price, so that
the stock market is not informationally e±cient in the sense of the stock
price not being a su±cient statistic for the information held by insiders (the
managers).
Under appropriate conditions, the manager's problem (1) has recursive
representation:3
2It follows from Blackwell's (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and
Scheinkman (1979) that a di®erentiable, bounded V
s(¢) satisfying (11) exists together
with unique policy functions characterized by (12) and (13) provided u(¢) and H(¢)
are increasing, continuously di®erentiable and concave, q(¢) and w(¢) are continuous,







0;d;q;w) is continuous as a function of (d;q;w). The
continuity of q(¢) and w(¢) is then con¯rmed in equilibrium.
3It again follows from Blackwell's (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and
Scheinkman (1979) that a di®erentiable, bounded V
m( ) exists that solves (14) provided
u(¢) and f(¢) are increasing, continuous and bounded, and that g
m(¢) is itself continuous






























1 (xt+1; ^ st+1)
[f1 (kt+1;nt+1)¸t+1 + (1 ¡ ­)]dF (¢); (16)
where this latter representation is obtained using a standard application of
the envelope theorem.
We focus on contracts for which gm(xt; ^ st) is linear in xt, i.e., gm(xt; ^ st) =
At+'xt, where At = A(^ st) is independent of variables under the manager's
control.4 We will show that a properly designed linear contract achieves
the ¯rst best. In a companion paper we explore circumstances where the
¯rst best may also be approximated by contracts where the convexity of
the relationship between the measure of performance and the manager's
compensation makes up for plausible suboptimal features of the contract
itself.
A comparison of equation (5) with (12) and (15) makes clear that for
the standard optimality condition for employment to obtain, the measure of
¯rm performance xt must satisfy
@xt
@nt
= [f2(kt;nt)¸t ¡ wt]





Integrating these two conditions with respect to nt and it, respectively,
yields (up to a constant of integration):
and that dF(A
0;¸











0;A;¸) is also continuous in k and ¸. In order for (15)
and (16) to characterize the unique solution, the di®erentiability of u(¢), g
m(¢) and f(¢) is
required and u(g
m(¢)) must be concave. The assumptions made in this and the preceding
footnote are maintained throughout the paper.
4That is, under the usual assumption that the unique ¯rm is representative of a large
number of identical ¯rms behaving competitively.
9xt = f(kt;nt)¸t ¡ wtnt ¡ it + constant ´ ^ dt + constant :
In other words, if there is to be no ¯rst-order distortion in the decisions
of the manager, the only appropriate measure of ¯rm performance in our
economy is free-cash-°ow before payments to managers.
The intuition for this result is clear. Absent strong extraneous con°icts
of interest, in order to align the interests of managers and shareholders, it
is sensible to endow the former with a non-tradable equity position, hence
to a claim to a fraction of present and future cash °ows to capital. For the
rest of the paper we adopt this identi¯cation which is also consistent with
the minimal information requirement we may want to impose on worker-
shareholders.
It thus appears that the manager's contract should be of the form:
cm
t = '^ dt + At;
for some constant scalar '.
The last piece of the puzzle is to make sure that condition (7) obtains.
To discuss this issue, note that in equilibrium, at all dates t,
ns
t = nt; (17)
zt = 1; and (18)
yt ´ f(kt;nt)¸t = cs
t + ¹cm
t + it (19)
Equation (19) implies that condition (7), which requires that the two












'^ dt + At
´
=
u1(yt+1 ¡ it+1 ¡ ¹cm
t+1)








The homogeneity property of u(¢) in turn implies that equality (20) will
be satis¯ed if the consumptions of the two agents are proportional to one
another and thus to aggregate consumption, ct = yt ¡ it. Consider the
following equalities
10cm
t = '^ dt + At
= '[yt ¡ wtnt ¡ it] + At
= '(yt ¡ it) ¡ 'wtnt + At (21)
cs
t = yt ¡ it ¡ ¹cm
t
= yt ¡ it ¡ ¹[At + '(yt ¡ it) ¡ 'wtnt]
= (1 ¡ ¹')(yt ¡ it) + ¹'wtnt ¡ ¹At: (22)
These relations indicate that
At = 'wtnt:
It follows that cm
t = '(yt ¡ it) and cs
t = (1 ¡ ')(yt ¡ it) and the ¯rst best
obtains. We summarize these results in
Theorem 2. Suppose A.1-A.4 are satis¯ed and manager's e®ort is imma-
terial to production. Then there exists a unique ¯rst best contract,
gm(xt; ^ st) = '^ dt + 'wtnt, under which the competitive equilibrium
delivers the ¯rst best allocation of resources. 5;6
Theorem 2 makes three assertions:
(i) the optimal contract includes a \salary component" in addition to the
incentive element '^ dt;
(ii) the salary component is linearly related to the aggregate wage bill;
and
(iii) the power of the incentive component, ', also de¯nes the exposure of
the salary component to the aggregate wage bill.
5In all our model constructs, the ¯rst-order conditions are necessary and su±cient
under maintained assumptions A.1 -A.4. Providing a contract under which the ¯rst-order
conditions for the Pareto Optimum coincide with those of the competitive equilibrium is
thus su±cient to guarantee these two economic constructs have identical properties. We
appeal to this logic throughout the paper.
6We argue for uniqueness in the following way. By the concavity
of the objective function in problem (3), the associated policy functions
fn(kt;¸t);i(kt;¸t);c
m(kt;¸t);c
s(kt;¸t)g are all unique. Furthermore, by the argu-
ment above, ^ dt = ^ d(kt;¸t) is the unique aggregate on which incentive pay can be based.
Since c
m
t = '^ dt +At;At = A(kt;¸t) is also unique and must equal 'wtnt. The parameter
' = '(M;¹) is then uniquely determined by the optimality condition (8).
11The general message from this ¯rst discussion may be summarized as
follows. Contracting in general equilibrium requires not only aligning the
\micro incentives" of managers and ¯rm owners but also aligning their sto-
chastic discount factors. To insure that the trade-o®s internal to the ¯rm
are properly appraised by the manager, it is appropriate to entitle her to
a (non tradeable) share of dividends. This will naturally guarantee that
the manager will want to maximize the discounted sum of future expected
dividends. In a multi-period world of risk aversion, however, this is not
su±cient. Shareholders want to ensure that the same stochastic discount
factor as their own is applied by managers when tallying up future divi-
dends. This is the sense of condition (20). If the stochastic factors are
to be aligned, the total compensation package of managers must be such
that their consumption is proportional to aggregate consumption, that is,
to yt ¡ it = dt + wtnt. Since the incentive part of their remuneration is
a fraction of ^ dt, the salary part of their remuneration must be the same
fraction of the aggregate wage bill. In order to select the investment and
hiring policies the shareholder-workers would like, the manager must receive
an income stream with identical characteristics. Since shareholder-workers
receive the bulk of their income in the form of wage payments, the manager
must as well.7
In the next section, the exposure to dividends will be determined by the
extent of the moral hazard problem. But the central message will remain: in
the general equilibrium of a world with a representative shareholder-worker,
the various components of the manager's remuneration have to be \adapted"
to one another in order to form an overall package that is proportional to
aggregate consumption.
One interesting characteristic of this ¯rst-best contract is that it does not
require the manager to communicate with the principal after observing the
realization of the productivity shock. The ¯rst-best contract remains valid
even if one interprets the signal ¸t as speci¯c knowledge in the sense of Fama
and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Meckling (1992). There are a number of
reasons for such an interpretation to be desirable. As emphasized by Jensen
and Meckling (1992), knowledge transfer may involve costly delays. In ad-
dition, a particular value of ¸t and its implications for future productivity
are meant to summarize a set of soft (in the sense of Stein (2003)) and con-
tinuously evolving elements of information on which it would be impossible
7We note that a choice of M su±ciently large will guarantee that the manager's welfare
exceeds that of a representative shareholder. As a result agents would willingly become
managers. By equations (7) and (21)-(22) each M translates into a corresponding '.
12or costly to base a compensation contract.
Theorem 2 has the following interesting corollary:
Theorem 3 (Equivalence Theorem). Suppose the manager is of mea-
sure ¹ = 0. Then under the linear contract gm(dt) = At + 'dt with
At = 'wtnt the delegated management economy exhibits the same
time series properties as, and is thus observationally equivalent to, the
representative agent (real) business cycle model.8
The contribution of Theorem 3 is to extend the realm of application of
the standard business cycle model. The measure zero assumption is made for
convenience only to facilitate comparison with the standard representative
agent model. With a positive measure of managers, it would be necessary
to increase the productivity of factors to make up for their consumption in
a way such that the consumption level of shareholder-workers, and conse-
quently their labor supply decision, remain unchanged in equilibrium.
In the next two sections we con¯rm the essential intuition obtained here
and extend the main result in two directions. First we deal with the case
where managerial e®ort is a required input in the production process. In this
case we show the essentials of the prior contract are preserved. Additional
constraints, however, are placed on the share parameter ' leading to the
necessary inclusion of an additional term in the remuneration package. We
subsequently relax the assumption of a single ¯rm and identify the ¯rst best
contract in a world with multiple ¯rms subject to idiosyncratic risk.
5 The optimal contract: unobservable e®ort
In this section we focus on the main formulation of our problem where the
manager's e®ort is an essential element in the production process. Our main
result is expressed in
Theorem 4. If A.1-A.4 are satis¯ed, then there exists a unique ¯rst best
contract gm(xt; ^ st) su±cient for the competitive equilibrium to deliver
the ¯rst best allocation of resources. The optimal contract possesses
the following distinguishing features:
(i) gm(xt; ^ st) = '^ dt+At where At does not depend on variables under
the manager's control;
8As such this paper o®ers an alternative decentralization scheme to those of Prescott
and Mehra (1980) and Brock (1982). Shorish and Spear (2005) also propose an agency
theoretic extension of the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model.
13(ii) ¹' = 1 ;
(iii)At = 'wtnt + »(yt ¡ it);» ¿ 0:
Proof:
To prove our result we simply assume that the contract has the stated
form and show that the equilibrium conditions of the decentralized economy
then coincide with the optimality conditions of the planner's problem.
Problem (2) of the shareholder is unchanged. The corresponding FOC's
continue to be (12) and (13).
Under the proposed contract conditions (and taking note that, with full
information, the relevant aggregate state variables are, again, st = (kt;¸t)),
the manager's problem has recursive representation:9









V m((1 ¡ ­)kt + it;¸t+1)dF(¢); (23)
The necessary and su±cient ¯rst order conditions to problem (23) can
be written10
u1 (cm
t )'[f2(kt;nt;¹et)¸t ¡ wt] = 0; (24)
¡'u1(cm
t ) + ¯
Z
V m
1 (kt+1;¸t+1)dF = 0; where (25)
V1(kt;¸t) = 'u1(cm
t )[f1(kt;nt;¹et) + (1 ¡ ­)] (26)
u1 (cm
t )¹'f3(kt;nt;¹et)¸t = H1(et): (27)
Market clearing conditions (17),(18) and (19) apply. Equations (25) and
(26) together imply that condition (6) is satis¯ed. Similarly, equation (24)
9It again follows from Blackwell's (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and
Scheinkman (1979) that a continous, bounded V
m( ) exists that solves (23) provided
u(¢) and f(¢) are increasing, continuous and bounded, and that g
m(¢) is itself continuous
and that dF(A
0;¸











0;A;¸) is also continuous in k and ¸. In order for (24)
and (25) to characterize the unique solution, the di®erentiability of u(¢), g
m(¢) and f(¢) is
required and u(g
m(¢)) must be concave. The assumptions made in this and the preceding
footnote are maintained throughout the paper.
10In the usual spirit of a one representative competitive ¯rm the ¯rm's manager does
not take account of the impact of her e®ort on the At term of her remuneration.
14together with (12) implies condition (5). Equation (27) reduces to (10) if
and only if ¹' = 1.
Finally, for condition (7) to hold given (9) , one must have
'^ dt + At = '(yt ¡ wtnt ¡ it) + At = ¢(yt ¡ it);
for some scalar ¢: That is,
At = (¢ ¡ ')(yt ¡ it) + 'wtnt ´ »(yt ¡ it) + 'wtnt;
with » = ¢ ¡ '.
That » ¿ 0 follows from the fact that the condition ¹' = 1 implies that
the two ¯rst elements of the ¯rst best contract '^ dt + 'wtnt exhausts total
output. There would be no value added remaining with which to compensate
workers in the absence of the extra correction term.
In substance the main di®erence with the case of the previous section
is as follows: in order to obtain the ¯rst best e®ort level, the share of free-
cash-°ow to be awarded to managers is not indeterminate but must be such
as to elicit the right level of e®ort. Depending on the cost of e®ort and
on the role of managers in production, it may well be - as is the case in
our formulation - that the entire free-cash-°ows must be awarded to them
(¹' = 1). If it is the case, the general equilibrium condition uncovered
in Section 4, which states that the salary component must be adapted to
the incentive component of managers' remuneration, implies that managers
should be entitled to the entire ^ dt and to the entire wage bill.
As is, we are led to the conclusion that the collective of managers should
receive the entire value added which is of course not possible. But there is
a way out. It consists in the portion of manager's remuneration which is
exogenous to her own decisions being corrected by a term that is negative
and proportional to (yt ¡ it): » ¿ 0. This is the essence of condition (iii).
In words, the ¯rst-best contract stipulates that the managers' remuner-
ation should change one-to-one with variations in ^ dt (without limited liabil-
ity) with a salary component engineered to make sure that the time series
property of the manager's total remuneration is proportional to aggregate
consumption.11
Note that we have maximized the possible moral hazard problem here. If
either e®ort is partially observable or if there is a maximum possible level of
e®ort, then it is conceivable that the share of free-cash-°ows to be allocated
11Introducing a participation constraint for the manager would lead to pinning down
a single value for » and thus the level of manager's remuneration as well as its dynamic
properties.
15to managers will be signi¯cantly less than 1 and a contract close to the one
derived in the previous section, with a component proportional to the wage
bill but without the negative corrective term, may be feasible.
In Figure 1, we plot a representative sequence of At, '^ dt and total man-
ager's compensation. As should be clear by now, the entire package is de-
signed to generate a smooth consumption series for the manager, a series
with the same intertemporal characteristics as the consumption series of the
shareholder-worker. Here we have arbitrarily decided that the class of man-
agers have exactly the same consumption level as the class of shareholder-
workers. The incentive portion of management's remuneration is '^ dt. It
is signi¯cantly more variable than the consumption series. The di®erence
between the two series is At which almost appears to move one for one in
the opposite direction as the ^ dt series as must be the case if the sum of
the two series is to acquire the smoothness of the consumption series. Note,
however, that the two series are determined independently: in particular the
At portion of the remuneration is part of the manager's contract whatever
the performance of her own ¯rm. It is nevertheless clear that there will be
many instances where the manager will make up with the salary component
of her remuneration the loss in her performance-based remuneration induced
by poor ¯rm performance. Yet, the fact that the salary part of the remu-
neration depends on the aggregate state of the economy means that were
the manager to deviate from the optimal hiring and investment decisions,
a policy that would lead on average to a deterioration of the results of her
¯rm, her own remuneration would be a®ected and (on average) fall below
the ¯rst-best performance-based remuneration depicted here.12
In general, the main message resulting from the general equilibrium di-
mension of our inquiry is that there must be a balance between the per-
formance based and the non-performance based elements of the manager's
remuneration. Given that the consumption series of the manager should be
suitably smooth - because it must replicate the dynamic properties of the
consumption of the representative shareholder - and that the measures of
the ¯rm performance are bound to be highly variable, it is necessarily the
case that the salary component of the manager's remuneration will more
often than not cushion the impact of the performance-based remuneration
on the manager's overall compensation package.
12A short-lived manager could deviate and gain in the short run. Here we focus on per-
manent managerial contracts. In general, short term bias induced by short term contracts
would have to be corrected by an average compensation package that would be rising over
time.
16Note that the most implausible aspect of the contract illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, that the salary component is always negative, is partly an artifact of
our de¯nition of the variables. Assume indeed that ^ dt takes values in an in-
terval [^ dmin; ^ dmax], then the performance based component of the ¯rst-best
contract could equally be de¯ned as ¹'(^ dt ¡ ^ dmin) while the salary compo-
nent would be At + ^ dmin which, depending on circumstances, may always
be positive. If ^ dmin = 0, on the other hand, then it is easy to show that At
cannot always be negative.
In concluding this section it is worth stressing that the optimal contract
must be understood as one where the incentive component depends on ¯rm
level performance as measured by free-cash-°ow while the 'salary' compo-
nent depends on the aggregate wage bill. In the next section we formalize
this distinction in a more realistic economy with many ¯rms each with a
separate manager.
6 Many ¯rms
We now extend our analysis to the case of a large number J of competitive
¯rms. The management of each ¯rm is of measure ¹ 6= 0 and the total































Optimality conditions are straightforward generalizations of those ob-





























t+1 + (1 ¡ ­)
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t = H1(et): (31)
Our main result is
17Theorem 5. If A.1-A.4 are satis¯ed, then there exists a ¯rst best contract
gj(xt; ^ st);8j, su±cient for the competitive equilibrium to deliver the
¯rst best allocation of resources. The optimal contract possesses the
following distinguishing features:






t does not depend on variables under
the manager's control;
(ii) ¹' = 1;;
(iii)A
j
t = 'wtnt + 'd
~ j










t ; i.e., as a result of the above, all managers have the same
consumption stream as required by equation (30).
Proof: As before we postulate the form of the optimal contract and
show that indeed this contract implements the ¯rst-best allocation.Under

















































































Worker-shareholders are perfectly diversi¯ed. They collectively hold the
market and are thus entitled to the aggregate dividend that we continue
to identify as dt. They consume the unique consumption good and equally
share their working time ns
t across all ¯rms. Under these assumptions, prob-
lem (2) still perfectly represents the problem of the representative worker-
shareholder. In particular condition (12) still holds.




























t + it (34)









































t+1 + (1 ¡ ­)
i
dFj(:); (36)
which is nothing but optimality condition (29).














from which one sees that
¹' = 1
is required to obtain the ¯rst best condition (31)13.
Finally, we have to show that the Pareto Optimal risk sharing condition
(30) is satis¯ed in equilibrium. To that end, let us ¯rst observe that the
consumption of shareholders is proportional to (yt¡it). From the de¯nition











+ »(yt ¡ it) (38)
= '[dt + wtnt] + ¹'c
j
t + »(yt ¡ it) (39)
0 = 'cs
t + »(yt ¡ it); (40)
13This result implies that it would not be possible for managers to receive a ¯rm-speci¯c
share of their ¯rm's free-cash-°ow





(yt ¡ it) = ¡¹»(yt ¡ it):
Our second step is to note that the goods market clearing condition
(34) implies that if the consumption of the shareholders is proportional to






t = yt ¡ it ¡ cs
t
= (1 ¡ ¹»)(yt ¡ it):
The last step consists of observing all managers' consumption levels are
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t;j = 1;::;J (41)
Taking any arbitrary pair of equations in (41), say the kth and lth such
equations and substract one from the other, one obtains
ck
t(1 ¡ ¹) + (¹ ¡ 1)cl
t = 0;
from which it is clear that ck
t = cl







(' + »)(yt ¡ it); for j = 1;2;::;J:
This section con¯rms the message of the previous two sections: aligning
the interests of principal and agent in general equilibrium requires going
beyond the typical conditions identi¯ed in partial equilibrium. Making sure
that the managers do perceive the ¯rm-internal trade-o®s in the same way
as ¯rm owners is only the ¯rst step. Aligning the discount factors of the two
agent types is the second.
20Here the exact same logic as before requires not only giving the manager
a share of the aggregate wage bill but also a share of the aggregate stock
market.
Furthermore, the manager's compensation must be as sensitive to the
aggregate wage bill and to the aggregate dividend payment made by other
¯rms (or, by approximation, to the economy's total GDP net of aggregate
investment) as it is to the measure of performance of the ¯rm she manages.
Equivalently the optimal contract stipulates that a manager's (direct or
indirect) exposure to the equity value of the ¯rm she manages should not
exceed her exposure to the world market portfolio. This prescription is very
intuitive in the context of our model economy.
The presence of an e®ort dimension further results in the condition that
the collective of managers must be exposed, at the margin, to the full in-
crease in dividends resulting from their e®ort. These requirements together
imply that they should be attributed the entire world GDP! Hence, the ne-
cessity of a (negative) corrective term, which must be designed to preserve
the fractional proportionality of the managers' consumption to aggregate
consumption, arises.
One of the important lessons of our exercise is that being careful to
align the stochastic discount factor necessarily means not tying up the man-
ager's remuneration exclusively to the performance of her own ¯rm. On the
contrary, the overall package must have dynamic properties comparable to
those of aggregate consumption. This necessarily means that if the economy
is doing well while an individual ¯rm is doing badly, the manager of this
particular ¯rm may in fact see an increase in her overall compensation. It
is not necessarily an abuse of the system if a well-compensated manager
sees her overall compensation package increase even when her own ¯rm is
faltering.
Two ¯nal observations are in order. First, our contract speci¯es the same
contract parameters, ' and », for all ¯rms. This is unlikely to be the case in
reality. First, the implicit coordination necessary for ¯rms to o®er identical
compensation contracts would constitute employment collusion and likely
be illegal. A second, more relevant, reason is that across-¯rm di®erences
in monitoring regimes or in the severity of ¯rm-speci¯c incentive problems
may make the condition '¹ = 1 unnecessary from the perspective of aligning
the micro incentives of the manager with those of the shareholder- worker.
In the same vein, if stock holding is not uniform across the population
(limited stock market participation), the two elements of the manager's
remuneration should not be weighted as per the aggregate NIPA income
shares, but rather tailored to the distribution of wage income relative to
21capital income e®ective for the ¯rm's average shareholder (which may di®er
from ¯rm to ¯rm). Finally, one frequently observes ¯rms o®ering contracts
that are not linear but convex. In Danthine and Donaldson (2007), we show
that the incentives provided by convex contracts may, in some circumstances,
well approximate the incentives provided by linear ones and make up for sub-
optimal characteristics of the salary element of a manager's compensation
package.
A second issue is the following: does the absence of full information on
the private wealth of the manager and on her market actions (including sav-
ings) detract from our message? This is a di±cult question that has eluded
the literature. We note the existence of two con°icting views. Some authors
argue that the fact that managers are privately wealthy implies that they
should be almost risk neutral at the margin. Although shareholders are sup-
posed to be well diversi¯ed, they are not, however, risk neutral. Therefore
if managers behave as if they are, they are not taking the decisions share-
holders would want them to take. At the opposite extreme, the quiet life
hypothesis argues that, compared to shareholders, managers are excessively
invested in their own ¯rm and thus insu±ciently diversi¯ed. This, it is ar-
gued, suggests that they are likely to be excessively prudent, a fact that
may justify convex performance based contracts. Our interpretation is that
these two incompatible views re°ect the fact that the principal-agent liter-
ature is ill-at-ease with the main lesson from asset pricing: the stochastic
discount factor matters. In this paper we confront this di±cult issue head
on. The fact that managers may take private actions should not lead us to
conclude that the stochastic discount factors of shareholders and managers
will automatically be aligned. And the purported size of managers' income
and wealth cannot mean that monetary incentives do not matter (or else
the whole incentive debate is misguided!). If they do, it must be that even
if managers' consumption is not tightly constrained by their compensation
package, the latter indicates to them how the principals want them to view
the world and in which light they should make the ¯rm relevant decisions.
7 Related literature
Our emphasis has been to consider the implication of delegated management
directly within the standard neoclassical paradigm. Under the optimal con-
tract, the dynamics of the delegated management economy reproduce the
stylized facts of the business cycle. Aside from the basic informational asym-
metry, the structure of the economy is entirely conventional. By way of
22contrast, one particular hypothesis prevalent in the corporate ¯nance liter-
ature asserts that managers are 'empire builders' (Jensen (1986)) who tend
to over-invest and over-hire rather than return cash to the shareholders.
A small number of studies have sought to explore the implications of this
hypothesis within the dynamic equilibrium paradigm. In Philippon (2006),
managers have an inherent preference for size (¯rms with capital stock and
labor resources exceeding their pro¯t maximizing levels). Shareholders are
more willing to tolerate such excesses in good times, a fact that tends to
amplify the e®ects of aggregate shocks. In Dow et al. (2005), managers
also prefer to maximize ¯rm size. Their propensity to invest all available
¯rm resources is held in check by the arrival, in the subsequent period, of
costly auditors with the power to sequester excessive output. Albuquerque
and Wang (2007) hypothesize a group of controlling shareholders (e®ectively
acting as managers) who pursue private bene¯ts by diverting resources from
the ¯rm. Such diversions are held in check by investor protections which
vary across countries in their strength and e®ectiveness. Consistent with
empirical regularities, their model demonstrates that countries with weaker
investor protections should display overinvestment, larger risk premia etc.
As made clear, we eschew these empire building or corrupt manager class
of models, and postulate only that managerial preferences are de¯ned over
their own private consumption streams in a manner consistent with standard
axiomatic foundations.
A much larger literature has been concerned with optimal contracting
between investors and ¯rm managers in the context of static one period par-
tial equilibrium models. Analyzing as it does a wide range of principal-agent
relationships, this literature is too large to be summarized here. In e®ect it
has been concentrating on the performance-based element of a manager's re-
muneration and as such is somewhat orthogonal to the issue we have sought
to confront. See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a masterful review of
this literature.
Another large and important literature focuses on the use of debt con-
tracts and other mechanisms to align incentives between entrepreneurs and
investors (e.g., Diamond (1984), and Gale and Hellwig (1985)). Related
work places this discussion within the context of the choice of a ¯rm's cap-
ital structure. Harris and Raviv (1990) explore the idea that debt in a
¯rm's capital structure allows investors to discipline managers and provides
information, especially in the context of bankruptcy, for doing so. Stulz
(1990) focuses on ¯nancing policies as a device for discouraging manager-
ial overinvestment; Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Zender (1991) emphasize
bankruptcy as a mechanism to transfer control from shareholders to cred-
23itors. Here again the dominant context is one period partial equilibrium
so that the general equilibrium intertemporal considerations that form the
heart of our discussion cannot be addressed.
A ¯nal segment of literature attempts to rationalize the growing magni-
tude of executive compensation in particular as a multiple of worker com-
pensations. Explanations run the gamet from rent extraction facilitated
by enhanced managerial entrenchment (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003)) to the demand for top talent which is better able to manage a larger
resource base (Gabaix and Landier (2006); see this same reference for an
excellent survey of the literature). Our decision to ignore the participation
constraint of the manager constrains us from commenting on these issues.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the dynamic general equilibrium of an econ-
omy where risk averse shareholders delegate the management of the ¯rm to
risk averse managers. Our economy has both asymmetric information - the
manager is better informed than shareholders - and moral hazard - the non-
observable e®ort of the manager is an indispensable input in production. We
have derived the properties of the manager's optimal contract. This contract
attains the ¯rst best and it results in an observational equivalence between
the delegated management economy and the standard representative agent
business cycle model.
The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component
that is proportional to free-cash-°ow and is akin to a non-tradable equity
position in the ¯rm. And a variable 'salary' component that is indexed to
the aggregate wage bill and to aggregate dividends and may need to be
corrected by a negative term proportional to aggregate consumption.
In our general equilibrium context it is thus not su±cient to resolve the
'micro' level agency issues raised by delegation. Giving a share of divi-
dends to self-interested managers with private information is an important
requirement. Depending on the nature of the moral hazard and of the infor-
mation problem, the share of free cash °ows allocated to managers indeed
may be very high. Yet, a simple minded application of this principle leads
to endowing the manager with the wrong incentives. Because of the income
position she thus inherits, the manager will view the risks facing the ¯rm
through a lens - her own stochastic factor - that will possibly be widely at
variance with the lens ¯rm owners would like her to use. Aligning the sto-
chastic discount factor is an essential component of the incentive problem.
24This second objective delineates the properties of the state dependent salary
component. In our economy with a representative shareholder-worker, it is
a linear function of the aggregate wage bill, the aggregate dividend and
aggregate consumption.
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Note: Manager's consumption is depicted as the smooth middle-curve; it is the
sum of '^ dt with ' = 5, which is the top line in the graph and At. The latter is
negative for the case here depicted. The functional forms and parameter values
underlying this case are as follows: u(c) = c
1¡´
1¡´ ;H(et) = ze
°




t (¹et)·¸t; ® = :64,¯ = :99; B = 2:85; ­ = :025; ´ = 1;
¹ = :2; · = :1; ° = 1:75; z = :67; ¸t = ½¸t¡1 + ~ ²t;²t » N(0;¾2
t) with ½ = :95 and
¾2
" = :00712:
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